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subject to a different standard of review
than classifications prescribed by state
and local governments. [d. Thus, applying the mid-level standard of scrutiny
proposed by Fullilove, the Court held
the FCC minority ownership policies
constitutional. [d. at 3008-09.
In upholding the FCC's minority policy, the Court held that promoting minority ownership of broadcasting stations served an important governmental
objective. [d. The Court agreed with the
congressional and FCC findings that minority preference policies promoted diversity in programming. [d. The role of
the government, the Court reasoned,
is to promote the dissemination of
diverse information. [d. at 3010. The
Court determined that the process of
disseminating diverse information,
through programming, was essential to
the public welfare, and thus an important governmental objective.
After finding FCC preference policies
served an important governmental objective, the Court determined that the
FCC's policies were substantially related
to the achievement of the government's
interest. [d. In reviewing the nexus
between minority ownership and programming diversity, the Court deferred
to the fact-finding abilities of Congress
and the FCC's expertise and noted that
Congress made clear its view that minority ownership policies advanced the
goal of diverse programming. The Court
further noted Congress' continuallyexpressed support of diversity in programming through minority ownership. [d. at
3012-13.
The Court found race-based classification may be. permissible in some instances. In supporting permissible
benign discrimination, the Court analogized diversity in programming and the
fair cross-section requirement of the
sixth amendment, which forbids excluding groups from a jury venire on the
basis of race or sex. In addition, the
Court compared Metro Broadcasting
with voting rights cases that permit
benign discrimination to involve minorities in the political process. [d. at 3019.
Similarly, the Court reasoned, benign
discrimination is permiSSible to promote
programming diversity. [d.
Next, the Court rejected Shurberg's
final contention that the minority distress policy operated to exclude nonminorities from consideration in the trans30- The Law Forum/21.1

fer of certain stations, and thus unduly
burdens nonminorities. [d. at 3025. As
the majority noted, the policy could only
be invoked at the Commission's discretion and distress sales only involved a
small number of broadcast licenses. Furthermore, the power to invoke the distress sale was in the hands of the nonminority station owner who may choose
to seek renewal by attending an FCC
hearing, rather than sell his license to a
minority group. This, the Court found,
decreased the chance that nonminorities would suffer an undue burden. [d. at
3027.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, contended
that the constitution's guarantee of
equal protection bound the federal and
state governments equally, and that no
lower level of scrutiny should be applied
for federal action. [d. at 3030 (O'Connor, )., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
opined that the guarantee of equal protection extended to each citizen, regardless of race. [d. at 3032 (O'Connor,
)., dissenting). Neither the federal
government nor the states may deny any
person equal protection of the laws and
governmental distinctions, she contended,
among citizens based on race or ethnicity would exact costs and carry substantial dangers. [d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor believed the
FCC policies should have been evaluated under strict scrutiny and that under
such analysis, the FCC policies would
fail. [d. at 3044.
Metro Broadcasting is Significant as it
illustrates the Supreme Court's implementation of an intermediate level of
review for federal race-conscious affirmative action policies. While state programs continue to receive a strict scrutiny standard of review, federal affirmative
action programs with the approval of
Congress, need only survive the mid-.
level test for constitutionality. Metro
Broadcasting also signifies that Fullilove remains good law.
- Daryl D.Jones

Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz:
STATE'S USE OF SOBRIETY
CHECKPOINTS DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court held that
state highway sobriety checkpoints do
not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that the state's
interest in preventing drunk driving
outweighed any intrusion upon drivers.
The Michigan Department of State
Police established a sobriety checkpoint
program in 1986. Under specific gUidelines, sobriety checkpoints would be set
up at selected sites along state roads.
Vehicles passing through the checkpoints would be stopped, and their drivers would be briefly examined for signs
of intoxication. Drivers displaying signs
of alcohol impairment would be directed
to a location out of the traffic flow
where an officer would check the driver's license and car registration and, if
warranted, conduct further sobriety
tests. An arrest would be made if the test
results and observations by the police
suggested that the driver was intoxicated. [d. at 2484. At the only checkpoint operated under the program, two
of the drivers stopped were arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol.
[d.

Respondents, the day before the operation of the first checkpOint, filed a
complaint seeking relief from potential
subjection to the checkpOints. The trial
court applied the balancing test set forth
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979),
to decide the program's constitutionality. This three prong test involved
"balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the
level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." Sitz,
110 s. Ct. at 2484 (citing Brown, 433
u.s. at 50-51). After applying the test,
the trial court determined that the program violated the fourth amendment. [d.
Affirming the decision, the Michigan .
Court of Appeals stated that the trial
court was correct in its findings that the
state had "a 'grave and legitimate' interest in curbing drunken driving; [but]
that sobriety checkpoint programs are

generally 'ineffective' and, therefore, do
.not significantly further that interest;
and that the checkpoints' 'subjective
intrusion' on individual liberties is substantial." Id at 2484-85.
At the Supreme Court, respondents
argued that a probable cause or reasonable suspicion analysis was required,
rather than the Brown balancing test. Id
at 2485. Relying on Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, 489 u.S. 656 ( 1989), they
contended that there must be a showing
of some special governmental need beyond the normal need for criminal law
enforcement before a balancing analysis
is appropriate. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
Respondents argued that because petitioners demonstrated no special need,
sobriety checkpoints warranted some
level of individualized suspicion. Id.
The Court, however, disagreed, stating that VonRaab did not repudiate any
prior cases dealing with police stops of
drivers on public highways. Id. The
Court ruled that the relevant authorities
were Brown and U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 ( 1976), which also utilized
a balancing analysis in approving highway checkpoints for detecting illegal
aliens. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485. The Court
then reiterated its holding that a fourth
amendment "seizure" occurred when a
vehicle was stopped at a checkpoint,
and thus, the central issue was whether
such seizures were "reasonable." Id.
Applying the first prong of the Brown
balancing test, the Court emphasized
the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem and the states' interest in eradicating it. Id. The Court cited the statistical evidence, which showed that drunk
drivers "cause an annual death toll of
over 25,000, nearly one million personal
injuries, and over five billion dollars in
property damage." Id. at 2485-86 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,

§ 1O.8(d) (2d ed. 1987)).
The Court then examined the second
prong of the Brown balancing test, that
of "the measure of the intrusion on
motorists stopped briefly at sobriety
checkpoints." Id. at 2486. Comparing
this intrusion to the one upheld in
Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found "virtually no difference between the levels
of intrusion on law-abiding motorists
from the brief stops necessary to the
effectuation of these two types of checkpoints.... " Id. Thus, the Court agreed

with the Michigan Court of Appeals'
finding that the "objective" intrusion,
measured by the duration of the seizure
and the intensity of the investigation,
was rninirnal. Id.
The Court, however, disagreed with
that court's conclusion that the "subjective intrusion" on drivers, because of the
potential for generating fear and surprise, was substantial and unreasonable.
Id. Comparing checkpoint stops to roving patrol stops, the Court found that
the subjective intrusion of checkpoint
stops was considerably less, reasoning
that they were selected pursuant to specific guidelines with uniformed police
officers stopping every approaching ve·
hicle. Id. at 2486-87. The intrusion
resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint, the Court stated, was
"for constitutional purposes indistin·
guishable from the checkpoint stops...
upheld in Martinez-Fuerte." Id. at 2487.
Consequently, the Court held that the
"subjective intrusion" on motorists was
not unreasonable. Id.
Lastly, the Court considered the "effectiveness" prong of the Brown balancing test, measuring the" degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest."
Id. ( quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 ). The
Michigan Court of Appeals, relying on
Martinez-Fuerte and Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), found that the
program failed this part of the test. Sitz,
110 S. Ct. at 2487. In Prouse, the Court
struck down a system of random stops
made by Delaware Highway Patrol officers in an effort to apprehend unlicensed
drivers and unsafe vehicles. In that case,
the Court found no empirical evidence
which would indicate that such stops
were an effective means of accomplishing that purpose and promoting roadway safety. Id.
In this case, however, the Court found
that the empirical data supported a finding that the program was effective in
advancing the state's interest in preventing drunken driving. Id. The Court
looked particularly close at the statistics
in the record, which showed that approximately 1.5 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment, and that
sobriety checkpoints utilized by other
states resulted in arrests of approximately 1 percent of all drivers stopped.
Id. at 2487 -88. As the ratio found constitutional in Martinez-Fuertewas only 0.5

percent, the Court found no justification
for a different conclusion in this case. Id.
at 2488.
justice Brennan, in dissent, disagreed
with the majority's holding that "no
level of suspicion [was] necessary before
the police may stop a car for the purpose
of preventing drunken driving." Id. at
2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated
that even though a majority of society
would probably be willing to suffer the
minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint, the government should still be
required to prove that it had a reasonable suspicion for such a seizure. Id. at
2490.
justice Stevens, in dissent, believed
that the Court misapplied the balancing
test of Brown by undervaluing the citizen's freedom from random, unannounced, investigatory seizures. Id. at
2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He concluded that the majority mist*enly assumed that there was "virtually no difference" between a routine stop at a
fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a
sobriety checkpoint. Id. justice Stevens
was also of the opinion that sobriety
checkpoints were more intrusive and
generated more fear and surprise than
fixed checkpoints. Id. at 2493-94. Lastly,
he noted that the majority's analysis of
the "effectiveness" prong did not represent an increase over the number of
arrests which would have been made
using conventional patrols. Id. at 2495.
This decision is significant because of
the potential effect on other states. The
Supreme Court held that the intrusion
of sobriety checkpoints upon individual
liberties was rninirnal. Therefore, a state's
use of such checkpoints to prevent
drunken driving may be employed if the
checkpoints show some degree of effectiveness. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled
that sobriety checkpoints were considered a reasonable seizure as required by
the fourth amendment.
- Steven B. Vinick
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